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REPRESENTATION FOR THE INDIGENT
DEFENDANT IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS OF SOUTH AFRICA*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a sense of unfairness and injustice when criminal
defendants stand trial without legal representation solely be-
cause of their indigency. The picture becomes bleaker when
there is no jury and defendants are likely to be illiterate, unso-
phisticated, not versed in the official languages of South Africa,'
and of a non-white racial2 and cultural background. 3 In South
* Special thanks to Anton Trichardt, an advocate and member of the South African
Bar, for his invaluable assistance.
1. The official languages in South Africa are English and Afrikaans. Constitution
Act, No. 32 §§ 108, 118 (S. Afr. 1961). 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, THE BRITISH COMMON-
WEALTH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION, THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
625 (G. Keeton ed. 1960) [hereinafter 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN]. There are nine main
tribal languages: Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho, Pedi, Swazi, Venda, Bushman and Hot-
tentot. There are also a number of different dialects such as Ndebele and Tsonga. K.
KATZNER, THE LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD 354 (1986); N. VAN WARMELO, LANGUAGE MAP
OF SOUTH AFRICA 1-4 (1952).
If a defendant or witness speaks neither official language, an interpreter is provided.
Magistrate's Court Act, No. 32 § 6(2) (S. Afr. 1944); State v. Mzo, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 538,
539 (Cape Provincial Division, 1980) (it is the magistrate's responsibility to decide how
to explain the accused's rights and their implications; it is an irregularity if this responsi-
bility is delegated to the interpreter); State v. Mafu, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 454, 457-59 (Cape
Provincial Division, 1978) (it is per se irregular if the court fails to provide competent
interpreters, warranting the setting aside of the conviction and sentence). See also N.
STEYTLER, THE UNDEFENDED ACCUSED ON TRIAL 76 (1988) [hereinafter N. STEYTLER].
2. Under South Africa's apartheid system, all South Africans are required to be des-
ignated to a racial group. Population Registration Act, No. 30 (S. Afr. 1950). The term
"blacks" is used through out this Note as a legal term of art of the South African legal
system. That term, as well as the terms "whites," "coloreds," and "asians," carries legal
consequences because specific laws apply to South Africans who fit the description of
each of these groups. See Berat, Legal Aid and the Indigent Accused in South Africa: A
Proposal for Reform 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239 n.2 (1988); Ream, 18 UCLA L. REV.
335 n.1 (1970); Seltzer, 8 GA. J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 176 n.3 (1978). South African Presi-
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Africa during 1987, eighty percent of all criminal defendants
were unrepresented. In addition, because South Africa's judicial
system is adversarial, it depends on lawyers to champion the
parties' causes by presenting the main issues. 5 If the defendant
lacks effective assistance of counsel the attainment of a fair trial
becomes more difficult. Moreover, when the state, represented
by a prosecutor, tries an unrepresented defendant, a fair trial is
dent F.W. de Klerk is, however, in the process of eliminating the Population Registration
Act. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at AS, col. 1.
The total population of South Africa at June 30 this year was estimated to be
30.1 million, according to the Central Statistical Service. There were 21.1 mil-
lion blacks, 4.9 million whites, 3.1 million coloureds and 941 thousand asians.
The annual rate of growth in the population between 1980 and 1989 for whites
was 1%, coloureds 1.8%, asians 1.74% and blacks 2.3%. Annual increase in the
white population over the past four years amounted to only 0.65% because of
the relatively high emigration and the relatively low immigration since about
the middle of 1985.
The Star, November 24, 1989, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter The Star].
3. The South African courts have taken judicial notice of this predicament:
[n]or am I done yet with all the tribulations undergone by people defending
themselves. Additional and grave hardships are suffered in this land by those
who happen to be Black, as the great majority do indeed. Many are illiterate or
barely literate. Few speak or understand either official language, or cope well
enough to hold their own in a tongue that remains foreign to them. What is
said in our courtrooms to each of the rest, what he in turn says there, must
therefore be interpreted, word by word. But still he is not orientated. For
much of our jurisprudence is alien to the culture and traditions of the society
from which he springs. So are some of our procedures. Entangled in the work-
ings of a legal machinery that bewilders him, he has the most to gain from a
lawyer's help and the most to lose from the lack of it. Yet the barrier of pov-
erty stands highest in his very case.
State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 795, 812-13 (Natal Provincial Division, 1988).
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court became South Africa's highest court
in 1961 and hereinafter in case citations to this court this will be abbreviated as A. Origi-
nally, there were seven provincial divisions of the Supreme Court; the Natal (N.), Trans-
vaal (T.), Orange Free State (0.), Cape (C.), Northern Cape (N.C.), Eastern Cape (E.C.)
and South West Africa (S.W.) provincial divisions (South West Africa was originally a
mandated territory under the trusteeship of South Africa. In March 1990 South West
Africa gained its independence and is known today as Namibia.) There are three local
divisions of the provincial divisions: Witwatersrand (W.L.), Durban and Coast (D.C.L.),
and South Eastern Cape (S.E.C.L.). See infra notes 35, 42 and accompanying texts on
the Appellate and provincial divisions of the Supreme Court.
4. N. STFYTLER, supra note 1, at viii (quoting the Natal Mercury, Oct. 13, 1987).
Natal is one of South Africa's provinces. Others provinces include: Transvaal, Orange
Free State and the Cape province. In this Note, the self-governing territories and the
independent homelands of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Gaznkulu, Kangwane, Kwandebele,
Kwazulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, Transkei, and Venda are not included in the references to
South Africa unless specifically stated.
5. See infra note 21 and accompanying text on the adversarial and inquisitorial le-
gal systems.
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virtually impossible to achieve.'
Many countries have created various forms of legal assis-
tance to balance the inequity of being an unrepresented defend-
ant.7 South Africa has taken an unsatisfactory approach. While
it has created a Legal Aid office,8 it does not fund it adequately
to provide legal assistance to all who request assistance. 9 South
Africa's statutory safeguards are few, insufficient, and vague.10
The courts have tried to define these safeguards through various
decisions and to increase the protection afforded to the unrepre-
sented defendant.11 However, this has led to a dual system, with
6. The South African courts recognize this inequality in their judicial system:
[b]ut the State for its part would never dream of dispensing with professional
prosecutors ... Its massive resources are mustered and brought to bear on the
task, rightly since no amateur can competently perform that. Rank inequality
is then witnessed, once the person charged is an amateur too, an inequality
hitting no outlaw ... but lying between a prosecutor who has still to prove his
allegations and a man presumed, till the Court finds him guilty, to be quite as
innocent as the one in the street.
Khanyile, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 811.
7. Some solutions include legal aid, public defenders offices or an inquisitorial rather
than adversarial legal system. For example, Great Britain uses a legal aid system, with
matters referred to barristers. However, unlike South African lawyers, British lawyers
have sufficient interest in giving legal aid and sufficient numbers of barristers to under-
take the case load. M. Partington, Great Britain in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 158-76
(F. Zemans ed. 1979). See generally E. MOERAN, LEGAL AID SUMMARY (1978). The United
States uses a public defender system, funded by the government. The prestige of being a
public defender has been used as a stepping stone for lawyers in attaining political posi-
tions, thus making these positions attractive. Handler, United States of America in PER-
SPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID, 318-45 (F. Zemans ed. 1979) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON LE-
GAL AID].
The inquisitorial system, used in Germany and France, relies on a judge to arrive at
the truth of the situation. The attorneys are not adversaries, but aid the judge in the
search for the truth. The prosecutor's primary job is not to put the defendant in jail but
to ascertain the truth. It is the court's duty to take into consideration the defendant's
defense whether it is pleaded or not. See generally PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 134-57.
See infra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inquisitorial system.
8. Legal Aid Act, No. 22 (S. Afr. 1969). See infra notes 78-96, 125-40, 280-86 and
accompanying text.
9. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 21-22, 53; see also G. Hoexter, COMMISSION OF IN-
QUIRY INTO THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COURTS (1983) [hereinafter Hoexter
Commission]. The Hoexter Commission was a government-commissioned team of law-
yers and legal scholars asked to reassess the South African legal system and to present
recommendations for fundamental changes in the administration of justice.
10. The statutory right to counsel exists. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 11, §
3(1) (S. Afr. 1977). The right to representation exists only at trial and if a defendant can
afford it. E. DU ToiT, COMMENTARY ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 11-1 (1989). How-
ever, there may be an automatic review of cases with sentences greater than three to six
months if the accused was unrepresented at trial. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 30
§ 302 (S. Mr. 1977). See infra note 68 and accompanying text on automatic review.
11. State v. Blooms, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 417 (C. 1966) (the trial which had at first been
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one set of judicial duties for defendants with counsel and an-
other for unrepresented defendants. For example, procedural
and evidentiary standards are relaxed for unrepresented defend-
ants, but strict standards are maintained for defendants with
counsel.12 Ironically, this dual standard could make a defendant
choose to be unrepresented rather than to be represented by a
mediocre lawyer. This is contrary to the essence of the adver-
sarial legal system.13 It also avoids the heart of the matter: the
need for legal representation for all criminal defendants.
This Note describes the South African legal system, focus-
ing on its criminal provisions and the statutory and common-law
safeguards that attempt to protect the unrepresented defendant.
It also explores the causes of the existing problems of under-
representation. This Note then analyzes the current case law, as
well as the solutions presented by the academic legal commu-
nity. Finally, this Note concludes that South Africa's govern-
ment should increase funding for legal aid, educate its populace
about the existence of this program, and create incentives for
legal practitioners and law students to offer legal assistance to
indigent defendants. 14
postponed was suddenly advanced and the defendant had permitted the trial to proceed
because he was disconcerted and uncertain of his rights or how to deal with the situation.
Upon review the conviction was set aside because, but for the irregularity, the defendant
would have been represented); State v. Wessels, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 89 (C. 1966) (the failure
to allow audience through a legal practitioner to a person who objects to giving evidence
in a criminal trial is a gross irregularity); and Regina v. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 304 (A.
1960) (while there is no statutory requirement that a defendant be represented when
charged with capital offenses, it is a salutary practice of the courts).
12. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 58-62. Another example is that only the defend-
ant's counsel may cross examine and call witnesses. With an unrepresented defendant,
the judge is obliged to explain the importance of cross examination and to help the de-
fendant to cross examine witnesses without actually acting on his behalf. This is a very
difficult balance to strike. Id. See also State v. Rudman, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 368 (E.C.
1989); State v. Johnson, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. 368, 377-79 (E.C. 1989).
13. See infra note 21 and accompanying text on adversarial legal system.
14. This Note will focus on the unrepresented defendant in criminal matters only. It
will not discuss the effects of the current state-of-emergency legislation on the legal sys-
tem. Internal Security Act, No. 74 (S. Mr. 1982). While it is clear that the lack of inter-
est in extending legal aid to all defendants is partially based on the political and racial
problems faced by South Africa, these issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
[Vol. XVII:2
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II. SOUTH AFRICA'S LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE SAFEGUARDS CRE-
ATED FOR THE UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANT
A. South Africa's Legal System
1. History
South Africa's legal system is primarily based on customary
law, with large areas re-enacted by statutory law.15 The custom-
ary law is Roman-Dutch, introduced by the Dutch in the mid-
seventeenth century.'6 The law has developed over time so that
South Africa is the only place in the world where a truly uncodi-
fled system of civil law exists.17 Thus, its legal system is consid-
ered to be a hybrid of both civil and common law. During the
period of Dutch rule, the legal system was inquisitorial.'8 At this
early stage, the system acknowledged the need to help the de-
fendant charged with capital crimes who did not have the means
of procuring legal representation by providing pro deo services.' 9
With the advent of British rule,20 the adversary system re-
15. Duggard, The South African Constitution 1910-1980, in OUR LEGAL HERITAGE
105 (1982) [hereinafter Duggard].
16. Roman-Dutch law is a civil law system. Presently, South Africa is in the unusual
position of basing its common law on a civil law system. 5 H. HARLO & E. KAHN, supra
note 1, at 35-38, 41-42.
17. Duggard, supra note 15, at viii, 105.
18. See infra note 21 and accompanying text on the inquisitorial system.
19. Pro deo is the representation by advocates of the indigent defendant. This duty
was acknowledged by the legal profession as early as 1813. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at
26. This duty exists only for capital offenses. 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at
290. This representation is not a legislated right but a rule of practice of the Supreme
Court. Regina v. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 304, 306-07 (A. 1960); Lansdown, ANN SURV. S.
AFR. L. 348 (1960). Usually junior advocates are required to serve on pro deo cases. Ca-
rey-Miller, Some Aspects of Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings, 89 S. AFR. L.J. 71, 72
(1972) [hereinafter Carey-Miller]. See also N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 16. See infra
notes 52 and 100 and accompanying text on junior advocates and capital cases.
20. The British first controlled and influenced the Cape Province from 1795-1803
and again in 1806 until it was formally ceded in 1814. Natal was annexed in 1843 and
became a Crown Colony in 1856. 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 7. The Orange
Free State and the South African Republic (later Transvaal) represented the Boer Re-
public until the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, after which they became British Colonies.
The Union of South Africa was not proclaimed until 1910 when, under the British South
Africa Act of 1909, a unitary constitution was created. Sovereign independence from
Great Britain was granted in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster, declaring the Union as
a self-governing dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In 1961 the South
African Parliament passed the Constitution Act, severing the last ties with Great Britain
and converting the state from a monarchy into a republic. C. KENYON, SOUTH AFRICA:
LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2-3 (1982). See also J. DUGGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 267-68 (1978).
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placed the Dutch inquisitorial system.21 The British also incor-
porated a dual-lawyer system in South Africa,22 consisting of ad-
vocates, who specialized in court practice, and attorneys, who
functioned primarily as counselors and drafters of documents.23
Furthermore, the British introduced legal concepts such as pre-
cedent, trial by jury, and equal and impartial justice.24 The prin-
ciple of impartial justice was not regularly applied, however, be-
21. The main difference between these two systems is the manner in which the
"truth" is ascertained. In the inquisitorial system, the judge and legal counsel play an
active role in an attempt to establish the truth. Snyman, The Accusatorial and Inquisi-
torial Approaches to Criminal Procedure: Some Points of Comparison between the
South African and Continental Systems, 8 CoMp. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 100, 103 (1975)
[hereinafter Snyman]. Police files are open documents, the court calls and examines wit-
nesses, and the accused may also be questioned. Id. at 104-05, 109-11. See Brouwer,
Inquisitorial and Adversary Procedures - a Comparative Analysis, 55 AusTL. L.J. 207,
209, 212-14 (1981) [hereinafter Brouwer]. The defense lawyer and prosecutor may sug-
gest further questions and evidence, but there is no onus on either party to prove the
innocence or guilt of the accused since it is the court's duty to establish the "truth."
Snyman, supra, at 103-04, 106-07; Brouwer, supra, at 212-14.
On the other hand, the adversary system is party-based and depends on the vigorous
argument of two partisan and skilled lawyers to arrive at the truth. The litigants must
advance the issues by selecting the evidence most favorable to their case. The issues this
evidence presents is for a decision by an impartial and passive judge, and depends on the
skill of the lawyers. Certoma, The Accusatory System v. the Inquisitorial System: Pro-
cedural Truth v. Fact?, 56 AusTL. L.J. 288 (1982) [hereinafter Certoma]. See also S.
LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-2, 4 (1984) [hereinafter S. LANDSMAN]. In the ad-
versary system, the litigants generally are responsible for "investigating and presenting
the facts from a partisan perspective." Zeidler, Evaluation of the Adversary System: As
Comparison, Some Remarks on the Investigatory System of Procedure, 55 AUSTL. L.J.
390, 395 (1981). The facts thereby delineate the issues. Certoma, supra, at 288. The liti-
gants further refine the issues through plea bargaining and admissions. N. STEYTLER,
supra note 1, at 4. Usually, the accused cannot be compelled to testify under the adver-
sarial system. Zeidler, supra, at 395; Certoma, supra, at 291. The credibility of the testi-
mony presented must be tested by the opposing litigants. Zeidler, supra, at 397. The
judge may determine the admissibility of evidence and compliance of the parties to the
rules of court. Snyman, supra, at 110. Otherwise, the judge is passive and makes a deci-
sion based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. S. LANDSMAN, supra, at 3;
Snyman, supra, at 103; Zeidler, supra, at 395. Thus, in an adversary system, the unrep-
resented defendant is afforded little protection due to the passive role taken by the judge
and the onus on the litigants to raise the important issues. Brouwer, supra, at 208.
22. 5 H.,HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 42.
23. Advocates are given exclusive control of litigation in the Supreme Courts (each
province has at least one provincial division of the Supreme Court), while attorneys have
exclusive rights to draft contracts and other documents. See infra notes 42, 52 and ac-
companying texts on the different provincial divisions of the Supreme Court and on ad-
vocates and attorneys, respectively.
24. The Roman-Dutch law recognized the principle of equality before the law. 5 H.
HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 794. However, the principle was first directly ac-
cepted in the Cape Colony when the Cape was brought under British rule. N. STEYTLER,
supra note 1, at 12, 25-34.
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cause the legal system had separate courts for blacks.25 These
courts were abolished in 1984-85.26 In 1969, the South African
Government abolished the jury system because it was too costly
and time-consuming.27
The present South African Government incorporates certain
fundamental principles into its legal system: (1) equality before
the law;28 (2) a presumption of innocence until proven guilty;29
(3) a requirement that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal matters;30 (4) the right to legal representa-
tion;3' (5) the right against self-incrimination; 32 (6) the right to
remain silent;33 and (7) the right to place one's case before the
court.3 4 The South African legal system also uses the rules of
25. For a discussion of the racial designations of South Africans see supra note 2
and accompanying text.
26. "Black Laws" and "Courts of Chiefs and Headmen" still exist, however. While it
seems alien to have a split judicial system in the same country, especially a division
based on race, these tribal courts do serve a practical function: they are an indigenous
cultural institution, supported by blacks and by experts in black customary law. They
also tend to be in rural black areas not serviced by other courts. See Hoexter Commis-
sion, supra note 9, at part I, para. 3.4.3.8.
27. Abolition of Juries Act, No. 34 (S. Mr. 1969). There is more chance for bias with
a non-jury system, not only because the defendant does not benefit from a jury verdict
concerning issues of witnesses' credibility and the facts, but because personal prejudices
of the presiding judicial officer can go unchecked. 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1,
at 260-64.
28. This principle is proclaimed in the preamble of the Constitution Act, No. 110 (S.
Afr. 1983). It states as one of the national goals "[t]o uphold the independence of the
judiciary and the equality of all under the law." Id. This goal has been tempered, how-
ever, by the "Judiciary [taking] cognisance of social relations in [South Africa]. It per-
mits discrimination between different races - but it must not lead to substantial ine-
quality." 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 135, 813.
29. Rex v. Ndhlovu, App. Div. Rep. 369 (A. 1945). See also 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN,
supra note 1, at 307. Some statutes do put the burden of proof on the accused but these
tend to be political crimes. Id.
30. Rex v. Bolen, App. Div. Rep. 345 (A. 1941). See also 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN,
supra note 1, at 308.
31. Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 10, at § 73(2). The right to representation is
available to those that can afford it. See supra note 10.
32. State v. Assel, 1 S. Mr. L. Rep. 402 (C. 1984) (the defendant has the right to
refuse to give evidence and the decision to remain silent or to testify is the prerogative of
the defendant); State v. Mdodana, 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. 46 (E.C. 1978) (the criminal defend-
ant has the right to close without leading any evidence).
33. Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 10, at § 151(1)(b). State v. Evans, 4 S. Mr.
L. Rep. 52 (C. 1981), (confirmed, State v. Daniels, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 275 (A. 1983)); Assel,
1 S. Mr. L. Rep. 402.
34. State v. Mabote, 1 S. Mr. L. Rep. 745 (0. 1983) (the defendant has the right to
address the court before judgment on the merits and the opportunity to do so must be
afforded him regardless of his prospects of success); State v. Hlongwane, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep.
321 (N. 1982) (the right for unrepresented defendants to subpoena witnesses is part of
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precedence including stare decisis, as well as binding and per-
suasive decisions.3 5 Today, however, the rules of procedure have
become more complicated, making it especially difficult for a
person not schooled in the law to participate in adversarial
proceedings.3
2. Court Structure and Officials
The court structure in South Africa consists of lower and
superior courts. The lower courts are the Magistrates' courts,37
the Regional courts,38 and the Black courts.3 The lower courts
their right to put their case forward). See also N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 156-57, 168-
72.
35. van S d'Oliveira, The Administration of Justice in South Africa in OUR LEGAL
HERITAGE, at 145, 154 [hereinafter van S d'Oliveira]. The Appellate Division's decisions
bind all divisions of the Supreme Court and the lower courts. It regards itself as bound
by its own decisions unless a decision "has been arrived at on some manifest oversight or
misunderstanding" or its attention "was not drawn in the previous decisions to relevant
authorities." W. HOSTEN, A. EDWARDS, C. NATHAN & F. BOSMAN, INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 230 (1983) [hereinafter W. HOSTEN]. The Provincial
Divisions, Local Divisions and lower courts do not regard themselves bound by prece-
dents of other divisions. However, courts are bound by decisions from higher courts in
their immediate hierarchical line. Furthermore, a single judge court is bound by a deci-
sion of a full court (meaning two or more judges) within its division. Id. See generally W.
HOSTEN, supra, at 230-45.
36. This difficulty has been expressed by the Natal Provincial Division court:
[t]he odds are stacked against [the unrepresented defendant]. He knows noth-
ing about the rules of evidence, rules mastered only through training and expe-
rience, rules that no tips he receives from the trial Court can equip him to
understand fully or apply effectively. He knows nothing of the criminal law's
subtleties . . . he has no real grasp of what counts in law and what does not.
State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 795, 811-12 (N. 1988).
37. These courts are divided into Magisterial districts with 325 magistrates' offices
throughout South Africa. These courts fall under the magistrates' section of the Depart-
ment of Justice. Their jurisdiction is determined by the Magistrates Act, No. 32 (S. Afr.
1944). These courts have jurisdiction over all criminal cases in their district except trea-
son, murder and rape. Penalties that may be imposed are limited to 12 months imprison-
ment, a fine not exceeding 1000 rand and corporal punishments with a cane only. These
courts also have civil jurisdiction over persons resident, employed or carrying on business
within its district, or where the entire cause of action arose within its district. The court
does not have jurisdiction over matters which exceed 1500 or sometimes 3000 rand unless
the parties have agreed to this in writing. The Act specifically excludes cases concerning
marriage, wills and the mental capacity of a person. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at
145-46. For the fourth quarter of 1990 the South African rand averaged 2.5325 rand to
the dollar. INT'L FIN. STATISTICS, INT'L MONETARY FUND, March, 1991.
38. The Regional courts have increased penal jurisdiction and were established in
1952. There are six regional courts. These are exclusively criminal courts with jurisdic-
tion over all criminal matters except treason and murder. Penalties that may be imposed
are limited to 10 years imprisonment, a fine not exceeding 10,000 rand, and corporal
punishment with a cane only. van S dOliveira, supra note 35, at 146. See supra note 37
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submit their appeals and cases under automatic review 0 to their
respective Provincial Divisions.41
The superior courts include the Supreme Courts,42 special
courts,43 and the Appellate Division." The Appellate Division,
situated in Bloemfontein,45 is the highest court of South Af-
for valuation of the South African rand.
39. These courts were created because a conflict arose between South African law
and native or tribal law. These courts deal solely with the adjudication of issues between
blacks in terms of indigenous law and cusfom so long as these issues do not conflict with
"civilized" legal norms. These courts include the Homeland courts existing in the self
governing territories and the independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Cis-
kei, and Venda. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 146, 149-50. See also Hoexter Com-
mission, supra note 9, at part I, paras. 3.4.3.1-3.4.3.7. These courts have their own hierar-
chy: Courts of Chiefs and Headmen, and commissioners' courts with right of appeal to
appeals court for commissioners' courts and, under special circumstances, to the Appel-
late Division. W. HosTN, supra note 35, at 229 n.64.
40. For a discussion of automatic review see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
41. The Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 28, § 294 (S. Afr. 1977). See also infra
note 42 on provincial divisions.
42. Presently, there are six provincial divisions of the Supreme Court: the Natal,
Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape, Northern Cape, and Eastern Cape provincial divi-
sions. See supra note 3. There are three local divisions: Witwatersrand, Durban and
Coast, and South Eastern Cape division. These have concurrent jurisdiction with their
provincial division counterparts. Judges of the provincial divisions preside over the
courts of the local divisions. The Supreme Court has original and unlimited jurisdiction
within its provincial boundaries. It is also empowered to hear appeals from lower courts
and to review the proceedings of lower courts and administrative bodies. Murder, treason
and very serious cases may only be brought before the Supreme Court. Penalties that
may be imposed are generally unlimited, including life imprisonment and the death pen-
alty. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 150-51. See infra note 57 regarding "serious
cases."
43. Special courts include the Water Courts (established in 1912 to hear any matter
connected with use of water from a public stream or underground water), Special Income
Tax Court (established in 1914 to hear all appeals from the rulings of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue), Special Court of Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act
(hearing appeals from the decisions of the minister and actions against persons who have
applied restrictive commercial practices), Court of the Commissioner of Patents, and
Court of the Registrar of Trade Marks. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 151-53.
44. Prior to 1950, Appellate Division decisions were reviewable by the Privy Council
in Britain. Thereafter the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa be-
came the final judicial tribunal subject to Parliament's legislation. The Appellate Divi-
sion consists of the Chief Justice of South Africa and 13 judges of appeal (this number is
determined by the State President and has varied in the past). It is solely a court of
appeal from the divisions of the Supreme Court only upon leave from the lower court
judges. Its decisions are binding on all courts in South Africa. Generally, appeals of both
criminal and civil cases are heard by three judges, while constitutional questions require
eleven judges. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 153-54.
45. Bloemfontein is the capital of the Orange Free State and the seat of the Judici-
ary. Both Pretoria (the capital of the Transvaal province) and Cape Town (the capital of
the Cape province) share the seat of Government, which moves back and forth every six
months.
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rica.46 The Appellate Division, as well as all other courts, lack
the power to contravene the laws passed by the South African
Parliament.4 The courts' only role is to interpret the laws.
Presiding officers of the courts include the Chief Justice,48
judges,49 acting judges,5" and magistrates."' Court officers in-
clude legal practitioners (advocates and attorneys), 5 attorneys-
46. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 227. See supra note 44.
47. The South African Constitution establishes the supremacy of Parliament:
(1) Parliament shall be the sovereign legislative authority in and over the Re-
public, and shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good gov-
ernment of the Republic.
(2) No court of law shall be competent to enquire into or to pronounce upon
the validity of any Act passed by parliament, other than an Act which repeals
or amends or purports to appeal or amend the provision of section one hun-
dred and eight and one hundred and eighteen.
Constitution Act, No. 32, § 59 (S. Ar. 1961).
48. This person is the Chief Justice of the Appellate Division and is selected by the
Governor-General from among the judges. 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 264.
49. Technically, judges for all superior courts may be chosen with the sole qualifica-
tion of being a "fit and proper person." 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 264. In
practice, however, judges are chosen from the ranks of senior advocates (a title obtained
after 15 years of work at the Bar and upon application to the Minister of Justice). A
judge may be removed from office only by the State President on the grounds of miscon-
duct or incompetence. "A judge's salary may not be reduced while he holds office." van S
d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 155. There is compulsory retirement for judges at the age of
seventy. 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 264.
50. Acting judges are appointed for six-month terms by the Minister of Justice,
mainly to the lower and special courts. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 154-55.
51. Magistrates and regional magistrates are public service officials under the De-
partment of Justice, although they are independent and unfettered in their judicial func-
tions. They are appointed by the Minister of Justice. The minimum academic qualifica-
tion is the diploma juris (a legal degree of lower quality than that required for attorneys
and advocates) for a Magistrate and the LLB or diploma legum for regional magistrate.
The magistrate also has many administrative duties to perform. van S d'Oliveira, supra
note 35, at 155-56; 5 H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, supra note 1, at 273-75.
52. As in Great Britain, South Africa has a dual-bar system; advocates (members of
the bar) and attorneys (members of the side-bar). Although both are admitted to prac-
tice by the Supreme Court, their admission requirements differ. Advocates must have an
LLB degree, complete a four to six month pupilage under an advocate with five years
experience, and pass an exam on, inter alia, ethics, criminal procedure and evidence,
motion court practice, preparation and conduct of civil trials, and legal writing. Attor-
neys may have a LLB or a B Proc degree, serve two years under articles of clerkship
bearing the title of candidate attorney (1989 amendments to Act No. 23 of 1923) in a law
firm and pass a national exam. van Dijkhorst & Mellet, Legal Practitioners, in 14 THE
LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 213-56 (W. Joubert ed. 1981).
Advocates may argue issues in all the Supreme and lower courts. Judges are chosen
from their ranks. Advocates are organized in societies of advocates - one for each Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court. The societies impose discipline to safeguard ethical standards
as well as dictating a fee floor for services rendered. Advocates receive work from attor-
neys by being "briefed" on the issues or from the Bar (pro deo cases). Advocates may not
decline to take on a case unless they are appearing in court on the same day as the
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general (prosecutors),53 and administrative officers."" Other offi-
cials include the State Attorney, State Law Adviser, Master of
the Supreme Court, Registrar of Deeds, and other Registrars. 5
B. Safeguards For the Unrepresented Defendant
Statutory safeguards in the Criminal Procedure Act create
the right to counsel5" and the automatic review of serious cases s7
when a defendant is unrepresented at trial. Also, the Legal Aid
Act58 was passed in 1969 to create a national system for the de-
livery of legal aid. 9 This Act established the Legal Aid Board
proffered case. Advocates may not solicit business from these sources and this is so
strictly enforced that they will not visit the attorneys at their firms; rather the attorney
must visit them at their chambers. Id.
Attorneys draft all contracts and advise clients. Attorneys may not advertise their
services but they are allowed to solicit business and they are responsible for the client
relationship. They may choose which advocate to "brief." "Briefing" entails researching
the legal issues, presenting them in a memo for consideration by the advocate and then
discussing the strategy of how to present the case in court. Attorneys may argue issues in
the District and Regional courts but may not argue in the Supreme courts. The attorney
must pay the advocate's fees regardless of whether the client pays the attorney. Id. at
256-433.
This highly rigid, split-duty system means that a defendant who is only given an
attorney cannot be represented in the Supreme Court, while the defendant with only an
advocate will not benefit from the legal research normally done by the attorney.
53. Attorneys-general are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and
are subject to the control and instructions of the Minister of Justice. The State Presi-
dent appoints the attorney-general for each provincial division. The office has been non-
political since the Union of South Africa was formed. The office is held by a public ser-
vant concerned solely with prosecutions. This position's duties are determined by the
Criminal Procedure Act. Although the attorney-general may appear personally before
any court, his power is delegated to his personnel of state advocates (for superior courts)
and public prosecutors (in the lower courts). van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 158.
54. Administrative officers include the registrar (Supreme courts) and clerk of the
court (Magistrate's courts). van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 160-61.
55. Additional registrars include the Registrars of Companies, Patents, and Trade
Marks. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 161-64.
56. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 11, § 73 (S. Afr. 1977).
57. Serious cases are those cases where the defendant received a prison term of
three months or a fine exceeding 500 rand from a Magistrate with less than seven years
experience, or a prison term of six months or a fine exceeding 1000 rand from a Magis-
trate with more than seven years experience. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 11, §
302 (S. Afr. 1977). See supra note 37 for the United States dollar equivalent of a South
African rand. See infra note 68 and accompanying text regarding the automatic review
of cases.
58. Legal Aid Act, No. 22 (S. Afr. 69).
59. McQuoid-Mason, Legal Aid, in 14 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 181-82 (W.
Joubert ed. 1981) [hereinafter McQuoid-Mason, Legal Aid]. Prior to the Legal Aid Act, a
number of private and partially state-funded organizations provided legal aid services.
However, they were based on charity and this explains why legal practitioners tended to
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(Board) and the funds to support the legal aid services for those
who require legal advice and representation. 0 Other safeguards,
including the pro deo and pro amico systems, are found in the
common law.1
1. Statutory Safeguards
a) Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977
The Criminal Procedure Act codifies some of the defend-
ants' rights including: (1) the right to call and cross-examine
witnesses; 62 (2) the right to be present during the trial;63 (3) the
automatic review of serious cases;64 and (4) the right to have le-
gal representation. While the Criminal Procedure Act specifi-
cally included the right to counsel, 6 no provisions were made for
lose interest in them. Also, during the 1960s, a fund was instituted to provide legal aid
for political defendants but the organization was declared to be unlawful and was closed
down on the pretext of wanting to provide a national system of legal aid. D. McQuoiD-
MASON, AN OUTLINE OF LEGAL AID IN SOUTH AFRICA 3 (1982) [hereinafter D. McQuoD-
MASON, OUTLINE]; Cook, History of Legal Aid in South Africa, in LEGAL AID IN SOUTH
AFRICA at 32-33 (1974).
60. Applicants had to meet the "indigence" test. LEGAL AID BOARD, THE LEGAL AID
GUIDE, para. 2.4.1, Annexure D (1989) [hereinafter GUIDE]. See infra note 86 and accom-
panying text.
61. The pro deo system is a well established practice observed by the courts that all
accused in jeopardy of the death penalty shall be appointed an advocate at little or no
cost to the defendant. The pro amico system permits legal practitioners to decide to take
on a case for less than the required fees. D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at
11-13. See supra note 19 and infra notes 97, 109 and accompanying text.
62. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 22, § 166 (S. Afr. 1977).
63. Id. at § 158.
64. Id. at § 302. See supra note 57 and infra note 68 and accompanying texts on
serious cases and automatic review.
65. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 11, § 73 (S. Afr. 1977). See infra note 66 on
the right to legal representation.
66. Section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Act sets out the rights of a criminal de-
fendant to legal advice after arrest:
73. ACCUSED ENTITLED TO ASSISTANCE AFTER ARREST AND AT CRIMINAL PROCEED-
INGS. - (1) An accused who is arrested, whether with or without warrant,
shall, subject to any law relating to the management of prisons, be entitled to
the assistance of his legal adviser as from the time of his arrest.
(2) An accused shall be entitled to be represented by his legal adviser at crimi-
nal proceedings, if such legal adviser is not in terms of any law prohibited from
appearing at the proceedings in question.
(3) An accused who is under the age of eighteen years may be assisted by his
parent or guardian at criminal proceedings, and any accused who, in the opin-
ion of the court, requires the assistance of another person at criminal proceed-
ings, may, with the permission of the court, be so assisted at such proceedings.
Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 11, § 73 (S. Afr. 1977).
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defendants who could not afford legal representation.6 7
The Criminal Procedure Act also codifies the automatic re-
view system for criminal defendants.6 While automatic review
gives the unrepresented defendant some protection, its primary
function is to maintain control over the lower courts.6 9 The re-
viewing judge may only inquire whether the proceedings have
been conducted in accordance with justice and whether the de-
fendant has been prejudiced by a gross irregularity in the pro-
ceedings.70 The reviewing judge may not retry the case based on
the record, as this would be tantamount to an appeal.71 Only the
appellate judge may overrule a lower court's decision if the lower
court judge misapplied the law to the facts. 2 The reviewing
judge may, however, amend or change the defendant's convic-
tion, 3 thereby giving the defendant some protection from
injustice.
Regional court sentencing is not automatically reviewable. 4
Many cases decided in the lower courts are sent to the regional
courts for sentencing.7 5 Therefore the sentencing judge must
sentence the defendant based on a trial record over which the
judge did not preside.76 The lack of automatic review of sentenc-
ing decisions presents a large gap in safeguarding the unrepre-
sented defendants' legal rights.
67. It cannot be maintained that the pro deo system takes the place of statutory
incorporation of the problem of legal representation for indigent defendants. Although
the pro deo system is judicially upheld, it is not dictated by legislation. N. STEYTLER,
supra note 1, at 16. See also supra notes 11, 19, 61 and accompanying texts on the pro
deo system.
68. Automatic review is afforded to any conviction carrying a penalty of three
months imprisonment or 500 rand if the sentence was proclaimed by a magistrate of the
district courts with less than seven years service. All convictions carrying a penalty of six
months imprisonment or 1000 rand are reviewable if proclaimed by a district court mag-
istrate with over seven years experience. For any conviction carrying a penalty of a whip-
ping for an adult over 21 years of age, the punishment is subject to automatic review
regardless of the magistrate's experience. The Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, chs. 28,
30, §§ 294, 302 (S. Mr. 1977). See supra note 37 for the United States dollar equivalent
of the South African rand.
69. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 809-10.
70. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 810.
71. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 810.
72. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 810.
73. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 809-10.
74. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 810; N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 14-15.
75. The regional courts have higher sentencing jurisdiction than the district courts.
See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
77. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 810:
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b) Legal Aid Act No. 22 of 1969
In 1969 the Legal Aid Act was passed.78 Its charter estab-
lished the Legal Aid Board.79 Since the Act did not dictate the
structure of the legal aid system, the Board was free to create its
own system for delivering legal aid. 0 The Board is a corporate
body and sets its own rules which are not subject to direct re-
view or change by the South African Government." The Board
is funded annually by the Government but may accept funds
from any source.82 Legal aid is not regarded as a right but as a
privilege. s3 Legal aid is available not only for criminal cases but
also for all cases in which the assistance of a legal practitioner is
normally required.8 4 The Act's object is to "render or make
available legal aid to indigent persons." Because the Act did
not specifically define "indigence," it was left to the Board to
create a definition. The Legal Aid Guide86 states the criteria for
indigence, the funds to be contributed by the defendant, the fees
to be paid to counsel, and the type of services that may be ren-
dered. The Board also established a bureaucratic hierarchy of
However, with the increase in the substantive and sentencing jurisdiction of
the regional courts to include offenses as rape, and sentences up to 10 years
imprisonment, many cases which were previously tried in the Supreme court
with the assistance of pro deo counsel, are now heard in the regional courts
with the defendant unrepresented.
N. STEYTLER, supra note 1 at 14-15.
78. While the Legal Aid Act was passed in 1969, it was instituted in 1971. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text. Legal Aid Act, No. 22 (S. Afr. 1969). See N. STEYrLER,
supra note 1, at 17.
79. The Board consists of eleven members: one nominated by the Bar Council and
appointed by the Minister of Justice, four nominated by the Association of Law Societies
and appointed by the Minister of Justice, five civil servants, and a judge as Chairman.
Legal Aid Act, No. 22, §§ 2, 4 (S. Afr. 69).
80. Legal Aid Act, No. 22, § 2 (S. Afr. 1969). GUIDE, supra note 60, at para. 1.4.
81. McQuoid-Mason, supra note 59, at 194-95; Legal Aid Act, No. 22, § 2 (S. Afr.
1969).
82. Legal Aid Act, No. 22, §§ 9(1), 9(3) (S. Afr. 1969). The Board currently does not
receive funds from elsewhere, but the Legal Aid Act does not prohibit this. However, E.
S. Sholtz agreed that no foreign government or organization is likely to contribute to a
South African organization deemed to be under the direct control of a Government most
foreigners believe to be invalid. Interview with E.S. Sholtz, Director of the Legal Aid
Board in Pretoria, (Aug. 14th, 1989). [hereinafter Interview with E.S. Sholtz]
83. See van der Berg, Legal Representation: Right or Privilege?, 47 TYDSKRIF VIR
HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 447, 452-54 (1984) [hereinafter van der Berg].
84. GUIDE, supra note 60, at para. 1.5.1.
85. Legal Aid Act, No. 22, § 3 (S. Afr. 1969).
86. GUIDE, supra note 60. The GUIDE contains all the directives of the board and a
set of rules to enforce the terms of the Legal Aid Act with the force of delegated legisla-
tion. McQuoid-Mason, supra note 59, at 195.
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legal aid officers 87 and adopted the British legal aid system of
referring cases to attorneys in private practice and remunerating
them at a set tariff.8 "
A defendant qualifies for legal aid if he or she meets the
Board's means test of "indigence."89 This test sets out the maxi-
mum monthly income that a person can earn before becoming
ineligible for legal aid.90 Decisions to grant legal aid are made by
the legal aid officers.9" There are also situations in which the de-
fendant would be denied legal aid even if the means test Was
met. 2
The main problem faced by the Board is the acute inade-
quacy of its funding. 3 Even if adequate funds were available to
pay for all requests for counsel, there are not enough legally
trained practitioners available to do the work. 4 In addition, the
number of criminal defendants eligible for legal aid is greater
87. Legal aid officers are usually civil servants, members of the same Public Service
from which magistrates and prosecutors are chosen. This poses the problem of the officer
not being considered impartial in the eyes of the defendant. Hoexter Commission, supra
note 9, at part II, para. 6.4.4.8. Civil servants also undergo legal training but the schol-
arly degree obtained is of a lesser caliber than that obtained by advocates and attorneys.
Sampson, Legal Education, in OUR LEGAL HERITAGE 167 at 175-76, supra note 15. See
supra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text on legal training of court officers.
88. GUIDE, supra note 60, at Annexure E. A portion of this fee may be payable by
the defendant, depending on his income. Id. at 2.5.1.
89. GUIDE, supra note 60, at para. 2.4, Annexure C.
90. GUIDE, supra note 60, at Annexure C. Currently, the cutoff point is 1000 rand
per month for a married individual, with an additional amount earned of 150 rand al-
lowed for each dependent. Id. See supra note 37 for the United States dollar equivalent
of the South African rand.
91. GUIDE, supra note 60, at 4.1. Decisions are appealable to the Director of the
Legal Aid Board. Id. at para. 4.12. The problem of the defendants' view of the legal aid
officer not being impartial is especially relevant given the decision-making power the
legal aid officer has in determining legal aid eligibility. See supra note 87 and accompa-
nying text.
92. Many criminal cases are turned down: (1) if pro deo defense-is available; (2) if
the defendant admits guilt; (3) if the legal aid officer considers the offense or the defend-
ant's defense to be so simple that it can be advanced by the defendant himself; (4) for
any traffic offense; (5) in a preparatory examination (held where the "attorney-general is
of the opinion that it is necessary for the more effective administration of justice." Crim-
inal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 20, § 123 (S. Afr. 1977)); (6) for the institution of a
private prosecution (this may be instituted in terms of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, §
13 (S. Afr. 1977); (7) if the legal aid officer considers the defendant to be unemployed for
no sound reason; or (8) if the legal aid officer believes that the defendant leads a criminal
life (for example, applicants with previous convictions). GUIDE, supra note 60, at para.
3.1. See supra note 87 regarding the defendants' belief that legal aid officers are not
impartial.
93. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 18-22.
94. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 21.
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than the number that apply for legal aid, mainly because most
South Africans are unaware that the Board exists. 5 Finally, the
wide-spread belief that legal aid officers are not impartial and
cannot be trusted is another factor explaining why so few eligi-
ble indigent defendants apply for legal aid.9
2. Common Law Safeguards
a) Pro Deo System
The pro deo system97 was instituted by the Supreme court"
and is not under statutory rule. The Supreme court generally
will request its district's bar association to appoint pro deo
counsel9 in all criminal cases where the defendant faces the pos-
sibility of capital punishment.100 Defendants represented by pro
deo counsel are not eligible for legal aid.101 The advocate0 2 is
not paid according to the legal aid tariff, nor are any legal fees
paid by the Board; legal fees are paid from state funds appropri-
95. N. STEYrLER, supra note 1, at 18-22.
96. Hoexter Commission, supra note 9, at part II, para. 6.4.4.8. See supra note 87.
97. See supra notes 19 and 61 and accompanying text.
98. See Regina v. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 304, 306-07 (A. 1960). Regina v. Chaane, 2
S. Ar. L. Rep. 891 (A. 1978) (holding that there is no statutory requirement for the
appointment of pro deo counsel).
99. "In practice the appointment. . . is generally made by the bar on the instruc-
tions of the state, rather than by the court [S v. Gibson 1979 (4) SA 115 (D) 123]." D.
McQUoM-MAsoN, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 12. See also S v. Gibson, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep.
115, 123 (D.CL. 1979).
100. Capital cases include murder, treason, kidnapping, rape, robbery, attempted
robbery, housebreaking (housebreaking is a crime similar to that of burglary in the
United States) or attempted housebreaking, where the court finds aggravating circum-
stances (for housebreaking or attempted housebreaking, the possession of a dangerous
weapon or the commission of an assault or a threat to commit an assault; and for robbery
or attempted robbery, the wielding of a firearm or any other dangerous weapon; the in-
fliction of grievous bodily harm; or a threat to inflict grievous bodily harm by the of-
fender or an accomplice on the occasion when the offence is committed, whether before
or during or after the commission of the offence). Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 28,
§ 277 (S. Afr. 1977). See also D. MCQUOID-MAsON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 12. Other
capital offenses include the political offenses of sabotage (General Law Amendment Act,
No. 76, § 21 (S. Ar. 1962)), and the encouragement by a South African resident abroad
of violent change in South Africa, or the training of a South African resident abroad for
"furthering the achievement of any of the objects of Communism" or of an unlawful
organization, (Internal Security Act, No. 44, § 11 (S. Afr. 1967)) and, participation in
"terrorist activities" (Terrorism Act, No. 83, § 2 (S. Afr. 1967)). Id. Most capital cases
are heard in the superior courts. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35, at 150-51.
101. GUIDE, supra note 60, at para. 3.1.1(a).
102. Usually, the defendant does not receive the assistance of an attorney, only an
advocate. D. McQuoID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 12. See also supra note 52 and
accompanying text discussing the significance of not having both counsel.
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ated for the court. 03
The main problem of the pro deo system is that it is only
available for capital offenses in the Supreme court. 04 Defend-
ants who are tried in the Regional courts are not eligible for pro
deo assistance, despite the fact that these courts have jurisdic-
tion to hear capital offenses and to sentence the defendant for
up to ten years imprisonment. 0 5 Moreover, the appointment of
pro deo counsel automatically precludes the unrepresented de-
fendant from any legal aid from the Board.106 Thus, the defend-
ant may only benefit from advocate assistance, but not assis-
tance from an attorney. 0 7 In addition, most of the advocates
assigned to pro deo cases are young and inexperienced. 0 8
b) Pro Amico Services
Pro amico services'09 are rendered by the legal practitioners
to "deserving" cases. 10 If a third party pays for the services nor-
mal rates are charged by the advocate, but if the defendant will
pay for the services a lesser fee is permitted."' The main prob-
lem with these services is that it is up to the individual legal
practitioner to offer them." 2 This practice has generally waned
because practitioners feel that these services should be provided
by the Board."'
III. CAUSES OF EXISTING PROBLEMS
There are four primary reasons why South Africa has such a
large percentage of unrepresented criminal defendants. The first
103. State v. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 191, 196 (T. 1988).
104. See supra note 100 on capital offenses.
105. See supra notes 77 and 100.
106. GUIDE, supra note 60, at para. 3.1.1(a). See supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
107. See supra notes 52, 102 and accompanying text.
108. Carey-Miller, supra note 19, at 72.
109. See supra note 61 and accompanying text discussing the differences between
pro deo and pro amico.
110. The criteria for "deserving" cases is based on the individual lawyer's feelings of
moral obligation to render assistance free of charge to deserving and needy cases based
on personal standards. W. HOSTEN, supra note 35, at 826.
111. D. McQuoID-MAsoN, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 11. Advocates are required by
their bar to charge minimum rates for services rendered, except for pro amico cases. See
also van Dijkhorst & Mellet, supra note 52, at 248.
112. D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 11.
113. D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 11. See supra notes 78-96 re-
garding the Board.
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is the rapidly growing number of indigent defendants, and the
second is the scarcity of advocates and attorneys.114 The third is
the lack of adequate financing of the Board," 5 and fourth, the
lack of public knowledge about rights of defendants to legal
counsel and of the existence of the Board. 1
16
South Africa's economy has been declining recently because
of a recession and international sanctions." 7 This has increased
unemployment among the lower paid laborers" 8 and also has
contributed to the increase in South Africa's crime rate." 9
Ninety percent of the criminal defendants are black and indi-
gent. 20 The predicament of under-representation becomes ap-
parently critical with the increase in the number of criminal
cases coupled with a shortage of lawyers.
In 1989, there were 6829 attorneys and 1006 advocates 121
representing 30.1 million people.122 Civil matters compose ninety
percent of the work done by attorneys and advocates. 23 This is
not only because the majority of cases in the courts are civil, but
also because civil matters generally pay better than criminal
114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
117. See generally Dube, Bearing Pain of Sanctions; Blacks Hurt But See Need,
World Times Inc., Sept. 1989, at 6 [hereinafter Dube].
118. Id.
119. South African Crime Rate: One Murder Every 46 Minutes, United Press Inter-
national, Mar. 13, 1990; South Africa Unveils Crime Rate, United Press International,
May 30, 1989; South Africa Plans to Double Its Police Force, The Reuter Library Re-
port, Oct. 19, 1989.
South Africa's crime rate has traditionally been very high as has the number of
blacks executed. In South Africa, Hangings are Routine Justice, L.A. Times, Apr. 17,
1988, at 1, col. 3. The reasons are generally due to the apartheid system and the lack of
sufficient education of black South Africans. The lack of education, and, therefore, the
lack of many skills, contributes to the high unemployment. Id. See also Bruck, On Death
Row in Pretoria Central: Capital Punishment in South Africa, THE NE w REPUBLIC, July
13, 1987, at 18, and Dube, supra note 117, at 6.
120. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 19. "The low level of education and youthfulness
of a substantial portion of the accused are indicators of low occupational status, which
would place legal services beyond their means ... [I]t is apparent that more than 90%
of [these indigent defendants] were black." Id.
121. Telephone interview with a representative of the Johannesberg Bar Association
(Aug. 5, 1989). These figures do not include lawyers in the homelands. See supra note 4
on South Africa's provinces and homelands.
122. The Star, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1. The article quotes statistics from the South
African Central Statistical Service. See supra note 2 for racial breakdown of South Af-
rica's population.
123. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 21.
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cases, as most criminal defendants are indigent. 2 4 Even if all de-
fendants were entitled to legal representation there would not be
enough lawyers, let alone proficient criminal lawyers, to handle
the case load.
The foregoing problems are exacerbated by the inadequacy
of the Board's funding. 12 5 While the government has publicly
stated it will not decrease funding,'26 it is clear that the Board is
vastly under-funded. 2 7 The Board's 1987 budget was nine mil-
lion rand, 28 most of which was used for civil cases. 12  Only
1,284,289 rand 30 was spent during 1987 for a total of approxi-
mately half a million' 3' criminal defendants, while 150 million
rand is currently needed if all criminal defendants are to receive
legal representation. 32
Finally, the lack of representation results from the fact that
the majority of South Africans are unaware of their legal rights,
especially the right to counsel.13 3 Furthermore, most South Afri-
124. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 18-21.
125. State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 795, 813 (N. 1988). See also N. STEYTLER,
supra note 1, at 21-22.
126. Interview with E.S. Scholtz, Director of the Legal Aid Board in Pretoria (Aug.
14, 1989).
127. See supra notes 93, 124 and accompanying text on the need for funds for the
legal aid system.
128. Report of the Legal Aid Board for the Period 1987-1988, at 13 [hereinafter
Legal Aid Board 1987-88 Report]. In 1987 the average exchange rate was 2.03496 South
African rand to the United States dollar. INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 37.
129. Legal Aid Board 1987-88 Report, supra note 128. For the reasons why there are
more civil than criminal cases see supra note 92. Many criminal defendants believe that
because they are guilty of the crime, they should not be represented by legal counsel and
forego applying for legal aid. The defendant, however, does not realize that if the prose-
cution cannot prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the state should not be permitted
to convict the defendant, regardless of culpability. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 67.
130. During 1987, the Board only spent 2,365,800 million rand (32% of its budget
used for the year in question) on criminal matters. Out of a total of 67,874 cases applying
for legal aid, only 10,239 were criminal cases. Out of these criminal cases, only 7886
received legal aid, representing 77% of all criminal cases applying for legal aid. Legal Aid
Board 1987-88 Report supra note 127, at 7, 14-15. See supra note 128 for the 1987 ex-
change rate of the South African rand.
131. In 1980, it was estimated that a total of 500,000 defendants stood trial in the
lower courts. Using the GUIDE's criteria for indigence, most of the black, lower court
defendants would qualify for legal aid. Most defendants before the Supreme courts ob-
tain pro deo assistance (90% were provided with representation and a total of 2000 pro
deo cases were recorded for 1980). In 1980 it cost the Board 300 rand per case, so that if
all defendants were to be represented the Board would have needed 150 million rand. N.
STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 18-22.
132. See supra note 129.
133. Hoexter Commission, supra note 9, at part II, paras. 6.6, 6.6.4-6.6.10, 7.14.
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cans are unaware of the available legal aid sources.13 4 While tra-
ditionally it was not necessary for the court to inform the de-
fendant of the right to legal representation,'135 it was recently
held "' that the judicial officer must inform the unrepresented
defendant of the legal right of representation and of the oppor-
tunity to apply for legal aid. 3 7
Even if the defendants know of the right to counsel, they do
not necessarily know that legal aid is available through either
the Board or through pro amico services. The Board is aware of
this problem and has started to distribute information pam-
phlets in police stations and to inform school children of the
Board's existence.'38 However, the funding received by the
Board is insufficient for its legal work, let alone for advertising
and other educational purposes.13 9 In addition, the legislature
rejected the recommendation of the latest commission reporting
on the structure and functioning of the courts that more legal
aid sub-offices be created to publicize the scheme more
effectively. 40
The greatest obstacles to representation are the racial, so-
cial, cultural, economic, and political rifts between the unrepre-
sented defendant and the judicial system as a whole.' 4 The vast
134. Hoexter Commission, supra note 9, at part I, para. 3.3.6(c) and part II, paras.
6.6, 6.6.4-6.6.10, 7.14.
135. Wessels, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 89, 91 (C. 1966); State v. Baloyi, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep.
290, 293-94 ((T. 1977) (approved, Voschenk v. President, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 124, 140 (A.
1985)) (because the defendant did not request legal representation, no error was commit-
ted merely because the defendant was unrepresented); State v. Mthetwa, 2 S. Afr. L.
Rep. 773, 776 (N. 1978) (there is no obligation on the judicial officer to ask the defend-
ants whether they desire to engage the services of a legal adviser).
136. State v. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 191, 196 (T. 1987) and see infra notes 166-82
and accompanying text.
137. Radebe, 1 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 196. However, the court did not hold that failure to
inform the unrepresented defendant of these rights would per se create an unfair trial
and a complete failure of justice. Rather, the reviewing judge must apply a facts and
circumstances test. Id.
138. See infra note 281 and accompanying text on the "street law" education
program.
139. See supra notes 92, 124, and infra notes 302-08, and accompanying text on the
insufficiency of funds in general and the proposal that advertising should receive sepa-
rate government funding so that the Legal Aid Board can focus on delivering service.
140. See Hoexter Commission, supra note 9, at part II, para. 7.14.
141. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 14-15. For example:
[o]n occasions, unsophisticated accused have shown a reluctance to enter the
witness-box, although intent on testifying. . . . The accused supposed that his
entering it would signify either a capitulation to the enemy or a weakening of
his opposition . . . . [Also] there exists . . . among many unsophisticated
Xhosa witnesses a genuine fear of going into the witness-box as they believe it
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majority of unrepresented defendants are black, illiterate, and
young.142 Often they are intimidated by the judicial proceed-
ings,.1' not only because the vast majority of judges and prose-
cutors are white, 144 but also because the defendant is likely to be
going through the proceedings with an interpreter.1 45 Addition-
ally, the defendant's illiteracy gives him little competence to try
to defend himself in the court proceedings which involve many
complicated rules of procedure. 146
IV. SOLUTIONS PRESENTED BY THE LEGAL COMMUNITY
A. Case Law
1. Historical Perspective
Prior to the codification147 of the right to legal counsel, the
judiciary first recognized this right under the common law14 in a
to be bewitched.
Id. at 168. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
142. N. STEYrLER, supra note 1, at 18-19. See also supra note 3.
143. The intimidation felt by a criminal defendant has been described by the South
African courts as follows:
The [defendant] labors throughout under the disadvantage of an environment
that cows him, an atmosphere that chills him. It saps his self-confidence. It
intensifies the anxiety he feels already about his fate. And any prospect he had
of presenting his defence in a calm, clear and orderly way may well be ruined.
State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 795, 812 (N. 1988).
144. These statistics are for the Republic of South Africa only:
Total White Black Colored Indian
Magistrates: 812* 787 0 3 11
Prosecutors: 988** 84 28 66 33
Male Mags 703 694 0 3 6
Pros: 608 04 27 60 17
Female Mags: 96 91 0 0
Pros: 373 30 1 6 , 16
* = 11 vacancies ** = 7 vacancies
South African Department of Justice, January 1990. See also N. STEYTLER, supra note 1,
at 15.
145. See supra note 3. See also supra note 1 discussing languages of South Africa.
146. N. STEYrLER, supra note 1, at 59. See also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
147. The right was codified in Criminal Procedure Act, No. 31, § 218 (S. Afr. 1917),
re-enacted in Criminal Procedure Act, No. 56, § 158 (S. Afr. 1950) and presently codified
in Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 11, § 73(2) (S. Afr. 1977).
148. In criminal cases, a defendant, if he was also "present in person .... can by
permission of the judge employ the services of an advocate or the aid of an attorney if
perchance he is without skill in the business of courts." J. Voet, TREATISE ON ROMAN
LAW, para. 3.3.15 (1968). This permission was generally granted. See van der Berg, supra
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1906 case, Li Kui Yu v. Superintendent of Laborers.149 This
right was reinforced by subsequent cases. 150 The question of the
right of indigent criminal defendants to legal counsel has only
been indirectly discussed in Regina v. Mati in 1960.111
The Mati court set the tone for interpreting the right to
counsel as a negative right - a right that may not be hindered
by the courts, but a right that is not required by the courts.15 2
While Mati recognized the need for legal representation, the
court was unwilling to require representation for indigent de-
fendants even if they faced the death penalty. 5 3 The issue in
Mati was whether an indigent defendant charged with a capital
offense must be represented by counsel.""" The court held that
there was no rule of law requiring representation; there was only
a well-established court practice of appointing pro deo coun-
sel. 155 A number of cases since Mati have held that if the de-
fendant requests legal representation, a court may not hamper
the defendant's exercise of this right.156 A court may not, how-
note 83, at 448.
149. TS 181 (T. 1906); D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 5.
150. Rex v. Beukes, E. Div. Local Rep. 112, 118 (E.C. 1939) (defendant's attorney
requested a postponement so as to be adequately prepared for trial; the lower court re-
fused the request, and the reviewing court set aside the conviction as a result); Rex v.
Zackey, App. Div. Rep. 505, 509-10 (1945) (the refusal to accede to a request for a post-
ponement of a criminal trial can amount to a gross irregularity and form the basis of
review proceedings); Regina v. Slabbert, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 18 (T. 1956).
151. Regina v. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 304 (A. 1960). See also supra notes 97, 98 and
accompanying text discussing pro deo counsel.
152. See Mati, 1 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 306-07. See also State v. Mthwana, 4 S. Afr. L.
Rep. 361, 366, 371 (N. 1989).
153. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 306-07. See also supra notes 11, 98 and accompany-
ing text.
154. Mati, 1 S. Ar. L. Rep. at 306-07.
155. The state of the law has been described by the South African courts as:
There is no rule of law that a person who is being tried for an offence (carrying
the death sentence must] be defended by counsel. But it is a well-established
and most salutary practice that whenever there is a risk that the death sen-
tence may be imposed . . . the State should provide defence by counsel. . . It
is disquieting to think that . . . [a person can] be sentenced to death after a
trial in which by reason of his poverty he has had to conduct his own defence.
Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 306-07.
156. State v. Seheri, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 29 (A. 1964) (the defendant cannot be denied
the opportunity of having legal representation at trial merely on the ground of his attor-
ney's negligent failure to carry out his mandate; the court committed reversible error by
denying the defendant a postponement); State v. Wessels, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 89; State v.
Blooms, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 417 (C. 1966); Ndonozonke v. Nel, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 217 (E.C.
1971) (lower court judge refused to allow the defense attorney to resume defense because
the judge disliked the attorney's conduct; the refusal was held to be improper, and war-
ranted the setting aside of the conviction); State v. Nqula, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 801 (E.C.
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ever, force counsel on a defendant who makes an informed deci-
sion to forego representation; 157 that is, the defendant may waive
this right of representation. 5 '
The right to legal representation was broadened by State v.
Heyman in 1966.5 9 In this case, the Appellate Division extended
the right to legal representation to situations in which a person
was summoned to be subjected to an inquiry under the Criminal
Procedure Act. 60 The court admitted to a trend in the case law
allowing for legal representation of any defendant in danger of
being detained whether due to arrest or questioning.' 6' The
cases cited by the court also suggest a growing practice of recog-
nizing the claim that indigent defendants should be
represented. 62
Until recently, case law stipulated that once a defendant re-
quested legal representation, a court could not interfere and
must afford every reasonable opportunity for obtaining legal as-
sistance. The court held in State v. Baloyi,'6 3 that if the defend-
ant does not request legal representation, there is no rule of law
requiring a reviewing court to vitiate the proceedings merely be-
cause the presiding officer failed to inform the defendant of his
or her legal rights.164 This position has been changed by two
1973) (the court held that every defendant must be accorded the opportunity to present
his or her case to the court; thus, there is a fundamental right to be represented at trial.
Defendant's attorney was delayed and the court denied the defendant a postponement.
The denial was held to be a fatal irregularity); State v. Shabangu, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 555
(A. 1976) (lower court committed a fatal irregularity by refusing defendant a second
postponement where he had no excuse as to why he had not procured counsel after the
first postponement); State v. Mkhize, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 1065 (T. 1978) (to insist that the
defendant should plead after she had informed the court that she wished to consult a
legal representative is a fatal irregularity as the defendant is fully entitled to refuse to
make a statement and her legal advisor may answer on her behalf); State v. Yelani, 3 S.
Afr. L. Rep. 802 (E.C. 1986) (the defendant was entitled to the postponement he had
sought, and the magistrate erred by refusing because he did not accept that defendant's
attorney was genuinely ill).
157. State v. E, 2 S. Afr. L. Rep. 370 (C. 1981) (once a defendant has elected to
proceed with a criminal trial without the assistance of counsel, he cannot later reopen
the case merely because the result is unexpectedly adverse); State v. L, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep.
757 (C. 1988) (legal assistance cannot be forced onto a defendant by the court merely
because the defendant is a juvenile).
158. State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 811 (N. 1988).
159. 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 598 (A. 1966).
160. Id. at 602, 608.
161. Id. at 603.
162. Id.
163. State v. Baloyi, 1 S. Ar. L. Rep. 290, 293 (T. 1977).
164. "[W]here he does not seek it, and where no irregularity occurs by which he is
deprived of it, there is no principle or rule of practice . . . which vitiates the proceed-
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very recent cases: State v. Radebe 65 and State v. Khanyile.166
2. Major Developments in the Case Law: Radebe and
Khanyile
In Radebe, decided in 1987,67 the Transvaal Provisional Di-
vision held for the first time that the court has a duty to inform
unrepresented defendants of their legal rights, including their
right to legal representation s68 The defendant should be en-
couraged to exercise these rights.' Further, the judge should
inform the defendants of the seriousness of the charge and the
possible consequences if convicted. 70 If appropriate, the judge
should inform the defendants that they are entitled to apply for
legal aid. 17 ' Depending on the facts and circumstances of the
case, failure to do the above may be considered an irregularity or
a failure of justice warranting setting aside the conviction. 72
The Radebe decision reviewed two lower court cases. 173 The
first case concerned Radebe who was charged with car theft, and
sentenced to four years imprisonment. 7 4 After the close of the
state's case, the defendant asked for legal counsel and the court
refused. 5 While the reviewing court could have held that the
ings." Id. at 293-94. The court went on to say that:
[t]here are cases where, because of the gravity of the charge or the complexity
of the matter, the accused ought, in the interests of justice to be represented,
even though he cannot afford it. In such cases, if a pro deo defence is not
provided, it would be the duty of the Court to refer the matter to one of the
legal aid bodies or to invoke the assistance of one or other of the professional
bodies to appoint a legal adviser to act without remuneration.
Id. at 294. This holding was used in the Radebe and Khanyile decisions to point out the
evolution of the right to legal representation. See infra notes 181, 205 and accompanying
text.
165. State v. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 191 (T. 1987).
166. State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 795 (N. 1988).
167. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 191.




172. Id. However, the court did not hold that failure to do so whenever there was an
unrepresented criminal defendant would be an irregularity per se or a failure of justice.
Id.
173. Id. at 192. The first case concerned defendant Radebe and the other, defendant
Mbonani. These two cases were decided together because the appeals were "relate[d] to
the circumstances in which [the defendants] found themselves without legal representa-
tion." Id.
174. Id. at 197.
175. Id.
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court's refusal was an irregularity, the court went even further
and held that, because the magistrate failed to inform the de-
fendant of his right to counsel at the trial's commencement, the
conviction must be set aside.276
In the second case, Mbonani was charged with public vio-
lence and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 17 The trial was
held a day after the incident. s7 The reviewing court could have
held that the speed with which the trial commenced deprived
the defendant of the right to be adequately prepared for trial.179
While the reviewing court commended the magistrate for inquir-
ing whether the defendant wished to obtain counsel, it set aside
the verdict because the magistrate should have explained the se-
riousness of the charge to the defendant and also should have
explained the "advisability of obtaining legal assistance.' 80
Radebe, a landmark decision,' 8' is significant because it es-
tablished that the right to legal representation included the duty
to inform the defendant of this right.'82 Of greater significance is
the court's recognition that an evolutionary process broadening
the right of legal representation exists in South African case
law. 8 3
The Radebe decision, however, lacked concrete guidelines
for implementation of the right to counsel. The facts and cir-
cumstances that require a judge to inform the defendant of
these rights are unclear. Judges do not know when they are re-
quired to inform the defendant of this right and when the fail-
ure to inform constitutes an irregularity and a failure of justice,
obligating the reviewing court to set aside the verdict.8
Three months after Radebe, a Natal Provincial Division de-
176. Id. at 197-98.
177. Id. at 198. Two years of the sentence were conditionally suspended. Id.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 34, 149 and accompanying text on the right to be prepared for
trial so as to put one's case before the court.
180. State v. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 198-200. The court felt that this was espe-
cially warranted because the defendant said that he did not understand the usefulness of
obtaining legal counsel. Id.
181. Steytler, S v Radebe; S v Mbonani 1988 (1) SA 191 (T) Making Accessible the
Right to Legal Representation, 2 S. AFR. CRIM. J. 324, 326 (1988).
182. The proposition that judicial officers should inform unrepresented defendants
of their legal rights has appeared in many cases in the form of dicta. State v. Mthetwa, 2
S. Afr. L. Rep. 773, 776 (N. 1978); State v. Baloyi, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 290, 293-94 (T. 1977);
State v. Hlongwane, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 321, 323 (N. 1982).
183. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 192. This holding was used by the court in Khany-
ile to broaden the right still further. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
184. Steytler, supra note 181, at 328-30.
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cision, Khanyile, extended the right of legal representation to
include free legal representation for indigent defendants facing
heavy charges. The Khanyile8 5 decision held that a judge
should refuse to proceed to try an unrepresented criminal de-
fendant when based on equality before the law: (1) it is a com-
plex case with regard to either the facts or the law; (2) the de-
fendant lacks the maturity, sophistication, intelligence, or
articulation to adequately defend himself; or (3) the gravity of
the offense and the possible consequences are high.186 The court
stated that when these factors exist, unrepresented defendants
cannot effectively participate in defending themselves, thus ren-
dering the trial "palpably and grossly unfair. '18 7
The unrepresented defendant in Khanyile was convicted of
housebreaking with intent to steal and theft and sentenced to
imprisonment for a year.' The only issue at trial was whether
the defendant had committed the crime."8 " The state's sole evi-
dence was the defendant's fingerprints which were found inside
the house; there was no other evidence to link the defendant to
the crime. 190
At trial, the defendant was not informed of his right to
counsel nor afforded an opportunity to obtain it. 19' The court
could have decided the case on these grounds alone by following
Radebe.'9' Instead, the court went further and held that, in ad-
dition to the duty to inform defendants of their legal rights,'9 3
the judge also has a duty to evaluate whether the indigent de-
fendant needs counsel to prevent the proceedings from being
"palpably and grossly unfair.' 1 94 The court found that counsel
was warranted because there was no effective cross-examination
of an expert witness to adequately test the state's key evidence,
185. 3 S. Ar. L. Rep. 795 (N. 1988). The appeal was brought on automatic review.
Id. at 797.
186. Id. at 815. The opinion did not specifically state how these factors were to be
weighed nor against what standard. It left the decision up to the presiding judge based
on the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 815-16.
187. Id. at 816, 818.
188. Id. at 796-97.
189. Id. at 797.
190. The court believed it was critical that the defendant should have the opportu-
nity to properly cross-examine the fingerprint expert to establish the accuracy of the
match of the defendant's fingerprints to those found in the house. Id. at 798, 800, 812.
191. Id. at 799.
192. Id. at 800.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 815-16. See also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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which was critical to the defense.' 95
The Khanyile decision is the first case to interpret the right
to legal representation to be a fundamental right'96 rather than a
negative right. 9 7 The court stated it would have demanded that
all indigent criminal defendants be represented' but did not do
so because of the lack of both lawyers 9 and sufficient funding
of the legal aid system.200 The court also recognized that such a
holding would create an immense backlog of trial court cases be-
cause cases would have to be suspended until representation had
been obtained l.2 0 Therefore, the court settled for the less desira-
ble but more practical path of having the trial judge decide the
need for legal representation based on a case by case basis. 2
Nonetheless, the Khanyile decision still presents a number
of practical problems. There are too few lawyers and inadequate
legal aid funding to fulfill the requirement that only certain
cases require legal representation.20 3 While the strength of the
Khanyile test is its flexibility, its chief weakness is its wide
range of interpretations.2 4 The decision has also been criticized
as being too radical, 20 5 not only because of the practical
problems, but also because the court analogized South Africa's
situation with that of the United States.206
195. State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Ar. L. Rep. 795, 800, 818 (N. 1988). See also supra note
189.
196. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 810-11. See Steytler, Equality Before the Law
and the Right to Legal Representation, 2 S. AYR. J. CRIM. JUST. 66, 67-68, 75 (1989)
[hereinafter Steytler].
197. Khanyile, 3 S. Ar. L. Rep. at 817-18. See also supra note 152 and accompany-
ing text.
198. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 814.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 813.
201. Id. at 814. In addition, statistics show that defended cases take up more trial
court time. On the other hand, represented defendants' cases are not subject to auto-
matic review and therefore would not take up additional court time. Criminal Procedure
Act, No. 51, ch. 30, § 302 (S. Afr. 1977). See also supra note 68 and accompanying text
on automatic review.
202. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 814-16.
203. McQuoid-Mason, The Right to Legal Representation: Implementing Khany-
ile's Case 2 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 57, 61-66 (1989) [hereinafter McQuoid-Mason].
204. Grant, The Right to Counsel: Recent Developments in South Africa 2 S. AFr.
J. CRIM. JUST. 48, 51 (1989).
205. McQuoid-Mason, supra note 203, at 57-58.
206. In arriving at the holding, the court reviewed international and North Ameri-
can standards concerning the requirements for legal representation of the indigent crimi-
nal defendant. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 801-10. The court based its test on the
Betts v. Brady decision. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Khanyile, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 802, 805-06,
809, 814. The decision also discussed the similarities of the due process clause with the
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
3. Current Position of the Law
The judicial duties established by Radebe20 7 have been ap-
proved by the Appellate Division 208 in the decision of State v.
Mabaso e09 Natal's Khanyile test,210 which provides some unrep-
resented criminal defendants with counsel, has been overruled
by State v. Mthwana
In Mabaso the Appellate Division approved the judgment in
Radebe, thereby recognizing that the right to counsel is one of
the defendant's legal rights of which he ought to be informed.212
As was held in Radebe, failure by a judicial officer to inform the
defendant of this right may, in appropriate cases, constitute an
irregularity which would vitiate the proceedings. 13 In this case,
Mabaso and his co-appellant were convicted of attempted rob-
bery with aggravating circumstances and the unlawful posses-
sion of firearms and ammunition. 14 Mabaso was also convicted
of murder for which he was sentenced to death.1 5 While both
appellants had pleaded guilty at the pleading proceedings, the
magistrate held that the defendants had not adequately admit-
ted all the charges and therefore entered a plea of not guilty for
both defendants.2 1  At trial the appellants were represented by
counsel and each defendant testified that the admissions had
been extracted as a result of police violence and threats.2117 The
trial judge found that the defendants' testimony was not credi-
ble and sustained the convictions and sentences imposed.2 1 8
South African common law principle of equality before the law. Id. at 809-10. The court
used the South African principle as the basis for extending the right to counsel to re-
quire the state to provide counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Id. Critics of the
Khanyile decision believe that the South African legal system is so different from Ameri-
can law that analogizing to it distorts South African law. See also infra notes 244, 294
and accompanying text.
207. State v. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 191 (T. 1987).
208. The Appellate Division is the highest court of South Africa and its decisions
are binding on all courts. See supra note 44.
209. 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 185 (A. 1990).
210. Khanyile test, supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
211. 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 361 (N. 1989). This unanimous full bench decision directly
overruled Khanyile because Khanyile was a single judge decision in the same court. Id.
at 369.
212. State v. Mabaso, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. 185, 203 (A. 1990).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 189.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 191, 193.
217. Id. at 194-97.
218. Id. at 198.
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On appeal, the appellants claimed that when they appeared
before the magistrate to plead in terms of the charges, they were
not informed of their right to legal representation. 19 The de-
fendants claimed that "the nonobservance of this duty repre-
sented a gross irregularity vitiating the entire plea proceedings
: * * with the consequence that the trial Court had erred in fail-
ing to 'set aside' the plea proceedings . . ' [and the admissions
made] ... by the appellants."220 The majority opinion held that
the judge's failure to fulfill his duty does not automatically cre-
ate an irregularity in the proceedings.221 Assuming that there
had been an irregularity in the judicial proceedings, the real
question becomes whether, by reason of the magistrate's irregu-
lar omission to inform the defendants of their right to legal rep-
resentation, the trial court committed an irregularity in permit-
ting cross-examination of the defendants regarding the
admissions made during the pleading proceedings and in relying
on this evidence as proof of the guilt of the defendants.222 First,
the majority held that the trial judge has no power to set aside
the plea proceedings. 2 3 Second, the majority held that "there is
no unfairness in admitting a man's statements not otherwise
inadmissible against him . . . and if his election to plead guilty
results in the loss of the tactical advantage which a denial might
have brought him, that is not an unfairness which the law can
recognise. ' 224 The minority opinion specifically disagreed with
this last holding. In their view, the pleading proceedings were
improperly allowed in evidence at the trial and this constituted
a fatal irregularity. 2 5
The court specifically declined to decide whether, in addi-
tion to informing the defendant of his right to counsel, the judge
must "take steps towards securing such representation for an in-
digent accused. ' 226 The Appellate Division therefore missed a
valuable opportunity to hold that indigent criminal defendants
should be represented, which would remove one of the causes of
219. Id. at 199.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 204. "Whether or not an irregularity has been committed will always
hinge upon the peculiar facts of the case." Id.
222. Id. at 205.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 209.
225. Id. at 210, 215.
226. Id. at 203.
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injustice in the South African courts.227 Commentators feel that
the Appellate Division opinion is disappointing not only because
it did not state that a failure to inform defendants of their right
to counsel is an irregularity of the judicial proceedings in all
cases, but also because it declined to reinstate the Khanyile
test.22
Khanyile was overruled in the unanimous full bench Natal
Provincial Division decision of State v. Mthwana.22 9 In addition
to the Natal Division's rejection of Khanyile, two other provin-
cial decisions specifically rejected Khanyie.23 °
In State v. Rudman23 1 the court rejected Khanyile because
there was no statute that sanctioned the Khanyile holding and
because the court interpreted prior Appellate Division cases 232 to
preempt the Khanyile court from deciding the issue differ-
ently.2 33 Furthermore, the court criticized the reasoning used in
the Khanyile decision because it analogized the predicament of
the unrepresented defendant in South Africa with that of the
United States in 1945.234
In Nakani v. Attorney General,23 5 the judge stated that the
right to legal representation is an inherent right that cannot be
subject to the discretion of the lower court judges.23 6 The court
further stated that legal representation was a right that was in
no way dependent on the facts and circumstances of the case,237
and therefore rejected Khanyile. While the Nakani decision
could be considered an expansion of Khanyile requiring repre-
sentation of all indigent defendants, the court merely held that
there is a duty on the lower court judges to inform defendants of
227. Grant, Criminal Procedure - Strafprosesreg, 3 S. AFR. CRIM. J. 354 (1990).
228. Id. at 359-60.
229. State v. Mthwana, 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. 361 (N. 1989).
230. State v. Rudman, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. 368, 382-84 (E.C. 1989) and Nakani v. At-
torney General, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. 655 (Ciskei 1989). See supra notes 12, 207.
231. Rudman, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 368.
232. Rudman, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 382-84. Regina v. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 304 (A.
1960); Regina v. Chaane, 2 S. Mr. L. Rep. 891 (A. 1978) are the prior cases.
233. Rudman, 3 S. Aft. L. Rep. at 382-84.
234. Khanyile based its holding on the finding that the United States due process
clause incorporates the same standards as those that are fundamental and essential to a
fair trial, a requirement of South African's common law. State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L.
Rep. 795, 808-11 (N. 1988). Rudman held that South African courts cannot analogize to
U.S. decisions based on the United States bill of rights because South African law does
not have similar guarantees. Rudman, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 372-74.
235. Nakani v. Attorney General, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. 655 (Ciskei 1989).
236. Id. at 662.
237. Id.
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their legal right to representation and about the availability of
free legal counsel.238
Conversely, in State v. Davids,3 the Natal Provincial Divi-
sion240 followed Khanyile and responded to criticisms in the de-
cisions made by the Rudman and Nakani courts. The first criti-
cism is that the Khanyile test was unworkable in practice.241
The Davids court reiterated that the Khanyile test was a com-
promise that took into consideration the insufficient number of
legal practitioners available.242
Secondly, in determining whether the defendant should
have counsel, the court would have to preview the entire case.
This would require the defendant to plead his defense prior to
the state's representation of its case.243 The Davids court re-
sponded that the Khanyile test did not require a full preview of
the case. Instead, the court held that only a cursory review was
needed and that, ideally, the prosecutor should assist.24' Fur-
thermore, if the lower court determined that a defendant was
unrepresented, the trial should be postponed until the defend-
ant could obtain legal counsel.245 If no counsel was forthcoming,
the judicial officer must proceed, leaving the trial decision to the
Supreme Court on appeal, through either automatic or special
review241 to decide whether the trial was "intolerably unfair. ''247
Finally, the court stated that once the reviewing court decides
the conviction should be set aside, the prosecutor has the option
to indict the defendant again because the reviewing decision
238. Id. at 664.
239. 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. 172 (N. 1989). This case reviewed two lower court decisions.
Id. at 173.
240. This opinion, a Natal provincial division, full bench decision with one of the
three judges dissenting, was written by the same judge that decided Khanyile.
241. State v. Rudman, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 368, 384 (E.C. 1989).
242. Davids, 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 184. The court said that:
[a] compromise was deemed necessary, one reached between the principle that
the representation of accused persons was vital to the fairness of all trials in
which it was wanted. . . and the stark reality that our current resources could
never cope with the load they would have to bear if the principle were put into
immediate and universal practice.
Id.
243. Nakani v. Attorney General, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 655, 662-63 (Ciskei 1989).
244. Davids, 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 188-89.
245. Id. at 190. The Davids court never stated how long a court should wait in order
to allow the defendant to be provided with a lawyer.
246. Id. A magistrate can always request that his decision be reviewed under special
review. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, ch. 30, § 304A (S. Afr. 1977).
247. Davids, 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 190.
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would be based on procedural grounds and not on the merits." 8
The court would not be required to "remit the case for trial de
novo.',
249
A third criticism is that the Khanyile decision was decided
wrongly because there is no statutory duty to provide counsel.
There is only a duty not to hamper the defendant from seeking
counsel. 250 The Davids court held, however, that the judge is re-
quired by statute to conduct trials that comply with fairness and
justice. 51 In addition, the court found that to achieve a fair and
just trial it follows from this duty that counsel must be provided
for the indigent defendant.252 Finally, the court acknowledged
the criticism that the Khanyile rule will create delays.25 3 The
court held, however, that such delays are necessary for the sake
of justice and that it is the defendant's choice to either opt for
legal representation or a speedy trial. 54
The court in Mthwana255 ignored the discussion in the Da-
vids decision and held in contrast that Khanyile was wrongly
decided.25 6 The court gave three reasons for its holding. The first
was that Khanyile's reasoning was based on the false premise
that a denial of the right to representation necessarily results in
an unfair trial.257 Second, the court held that Khanyile incor-
rectly interpreted two Appellate Division decisions, Mati and
Chaane,58 to hold that the denial of the right to procure repre-
sentation made the trial per se unfair.259 Last, the court held
that Mati and Chaane21 precluded the court in Khanyile from
holding that there is a judicial duty to procure legal representa-
tion for indigent defendants.26' While recognizing that a lower
248. Id. at 190-91.
249. Id. at 191.
250. See State v. Rudman, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 368, 382 (E.C. 1989).
251. Davids, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 176, 182.
252. Id. at 176, 180-82.
253. Rudman, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 384.
254. Id.
255. State v. Mthwana, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 361 (N. 1989).
256. Id. at 368.
257. Id. at 369.
258. Regina v. Mati, 1 S. Aft. L. Rep. 304 (A. 1960); Regina v. Chaane, 2 S. Afr. L.
Rep. 891 (A. 1978).
259. Mthwana, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 366-67. The Mthwana court held that what Mati
and Chaane really stood for was the proposition that it was irregular to deny the accused
the right to legal representation. Moreover, if that irregularity was so fundamental, then
it per se vitiated the trial. Mthwana, supra note 151, at 366-67.
260. Mati, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 304; Chaane, 2 S. Afr. L. Rep. 891.
261. Mthwana, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 367.
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court judge has the duty to inform the defendant of his right to
counsel, the Mthwana court held that there was no further duty
on the court to halt the trial until counsel was provided.2 62 The
court specifically overruled the Khanyile and Davids decisions
so that the Khanyile test is no longer the law in South Africa
today.26 3
B. Academic Legal Community's Proposed Solutions
The solutions to the problems of underrepresentation pro-
posed by the academic legal community are to: (1) increase the
judge's involvement in aiding the unrepresented defendant; (2)
increase funding of the Board; (3) use law clinics, student law-
yers and lawyers fulfilling their national service requirements to
represent indigent defendants; and (4) educate the populace of
the Board's existence.
The first proposal places additional duties264 on judges to
help unrepresented defendants during trial.265 This solution does
not tackle the problem of the need for legal representation of
indigent defendants. It also does not recognize the difficulty and
undesirability of a judge acting as an advocate for the defendant
as well as an impartial decision-maker, as required by the adver-
sarial legal system. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
prosecutor should also assist the judge in protecting the rights of
the unrepresented defendant.261 This solution also seems im-
practical. Both of these suggestions would make the current
South African adversarial legal system take on characteristics
typical of an inquisitorial legal system.267
The second solution suggested by the academic legal com-
262. Mthwana, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. at 368-70.
263. Id.
264. Some of these additional duties include informing and assisting the defendant
to exercise the right to consider his position before pleading; to participate in the re-
mand and bail proceedings; to prepare for trial; to recall witnesses; to apply for a dis-
charge at the end of the State's case; to subpoena witnesses; to subpoena material wit-
nesses free of charge if the defendant is indigent; and the rights relating to appeal and
review. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 222-23.
265. This proposal is advocated by Professor Nico Steytler of the University of Na-
tal. See generally N. STEYTLER, supra note 1.
266. van der Berg, The Right to be Provided with Counsel, 1 S. AFR. L.J. 462, 470
(1988). See also Nakani v. Attorney General, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 655, 665 (Ciskei 1989);
State v. Davids, 4 S. Afr. L. Rep. 172, 189 (N. 1989).
267. Nakani, 3 S. Mr. L. Rep. at 663-64; State v. Khanyile, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 795,
799 (N. 1988).
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munity is additional funding268 for the Board, coupled with a re-
assessment of the way that the Board uses its funds.6 9 Instead,
the South African Parliament has chosen to ignore the problem
of the unrepresented defendant.1' Even if the funds are not
forthcoming, one leading commentator271 suggests that the
Board could use its current funds more effectively by hiring
public defenders instead of legal aid officers, who, in turn, refer
cases to legal practitioners. 2  Generally, public defenders can
process three times more cases than are currently being
processed by the legal aid system, because most practicing law-
yers do not specialize in the typical criminal cases faced by an
indigent defendant.
A number of interim solutions have been proposed to solve
the problems of the scarcity of lawyers relative to the number of
unrepresented defendants. Allowing law students to work
through a university's legal aid clinic to assist unrepresented de-
fendants can indirectly increase the amount of legal assistance
available to unrepresented defendants. 4 The students would be
responsible for preparing a defense or even for representing de-
fendants, with supervision, in the lower courts.2 75 Additional
manpower can also be generated by allowing candidate attorneys
to appear for the defendant in Regional courts.27 6 Finally, law-
yers who are fulfilling their National Service requirement could
268. See supra notes 82, 124-32 and accompanying text on Legal Aid Board's source
of funding.
269. This proposal is advocated by Professor David McQuoid-Mason of the Univer-
sity of Natal. Professor McQuoid-Mason is the foremost legal scholar in the field of
South Africa's legal aid system. See generally McQuoid-Mason, Legal Aid, supra note
59; D. McQuoID-MAsoN, OUTLINE, supra note 59; and McQuoid-Mason, supra note 202.
270. It has been written that:
Parliament has shown little concern for the position of the indigent accused
and has exhibited a reluctance to extend legal aid to all accused persons. Con-
cern for increased spending on legal aid, particularly in criminal matters, is not
a politically popular cause and major increases in funding may not be forth-
coming in the foreseeable future.
N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 22. A number of Commissions assigned the task to review
the problems of the South African legal system have recommended ways in which the
system can assist the unrepresented defendant, most of which the South African Govern-
ment has chosen not to implement. See generally N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 42-53.
271. See supra note 280.
272. D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 122.
273. D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 122.
274. See D. McQuoID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 169-71.
275. See D. McQuoID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 139-63.
276. See infra note 299 and accompanying text. Candidate attorneys are second-
year articled clerks or advocates under pupilage. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 15.
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be employed by the Board as temporary public defenders.
277
A long term solution would be educating South Africans
about the Board's existence. For a number of years the legal
community has noted the lack of public awareness of the
Board's existence, therefore showing the need for more public
education.278 As a result, both the Board and the legal commu-
nity are working to educate South Africans about their legal
rights and the services available to them.279 Pamphlets describ-
ing these legal rights and services are distributed in police pre-
cincts and by legal practitioners.280
V. ANALYSIS OF REFORM
There are two main avenues for reform: the courts and Par-
liament. Although the Natal Provincial Division overruled the
Khanyile decision,2 8' that holding could be reinstituted in a fu-
ture case in any or all of the provincial divisions. 28 2 Unless Par-
liament decides to enact legislation to the contrary, such a court
ruling could prompt the appropriation of additional funds for
legal aid. Unfortunately, because Khanyile was overruled and
Parliament has shown a lack of interest in ameliorating the
plight of the indigent criminal defendant,8 3 this seems very un-
likely. In the meantime, the proposed solutions presented by the
277. While their numbers are few, these lawyers could process an estimated 2000
cases a year. McQuoid-Mason, supra note 59, at 63.
278. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 55; D. MCQUOID-MASON, OUTLINE, supra note 59,
at 115.
279. High school students are being introduced to the legal system to try to dispel
the distrust and lack of understanding that exists today. Publications are made available
to teachers but it is up to them to use the materials. See generally D. McQUOID-MASON,
STREET LAW: PRACTICAL LAW FOR SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS (1987).
280. Interview with Director of Legal Aid Board, supra note 82.
281. See supra notes 267, 273, 274, and accompanying text.
282. A number of legal scholars have heralded the Khanyile test as both a challenge
to the legal community and a landmark decision. They have argued that it is workable in
practice if the legal profession, as a whole, supports the test by devoting a portion of its
time to this type of case and if the community at large realizes the importance of further
funding the Legal Aid Board. These scholars have also applauded the reasoning used by
the Khanyile court as having gone beyond the tendency of not applying the reasoning
used in United States cases merely because South Africa has no Bill of Rights. Khanyile
looked at the fundamental basis for the United States decision and, realizing that the
same principles and standards are to be found in South Africa's common law, applied
the United States court's reasoning. Furthermore, these scholars have professed that the
Appellate Division would be likely to uphold Khanyile upon review. See generally
Grant, supra note 204; McQuoid-Mason, supra note 203; Steytler, supra note 196.
283. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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academic legal community should be instituted.8 4 The two tiers
of judicial duty would be an effective interim step to protect the
rights of unrepresented defendants. The suggestion of having
public defenders instead of legal aid officers should be imple-
mented as soon as possible to use the Board's funds more effec-
tively. Moreover, the increased use of law students and lawyers
fulfilling their National Service duties would also help alleviate
the shortage of lawyers in the immediate future.
While requiring representation of all indigent criminal de-
fendants is the ideal long-term solution, there are a number of
other steps that should be taken by Parliament, the Board, the
universities, and the legal system as a whole to improve the situ-
ation. Parliament should pass legislation requiring the police to
inform defendants of their various legal rights at the time of ar-
rest. Ideally, the police would immediately inform persons held
for questioning or on charges of all their legal rights. Not only
should defendants be told of the right to counsel and of legal
aid, but also of the right to remain silent, the right against self-
incrimination, and of the right to have legal representation at
the police questioning stage. To ensure enforcement, failure to
comply with these requirements by the police would be grounds
for acquittal." While the current duties imposed by the Radebe
decision 286 are clearly an important safeguard against the possi-
bility that the defendant has not been informed of these rights,
284. See supra notes 264-81 and accompanying text.
285. The Judges' Rules, which do not have the force of law but are administrative
directions designed for the guidance of the police, provide for a cautionary statement to
be made to those that the police wish to question in connection with a crime.
The wording of a statement to someone to be questioned is suggested as being: "I
am a police officer. I am making inquiries (into so and so) and I want to know anything
you can tell me about it. It is a serious matter and I must warn you to be careful what
you say.,,
The wording of a statement to someone in custody and who has been formally
charged is suggested as being: "Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge?
You are not obliged to do so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may
be used in evidence."
The wording of a statement to someone in custody and who has not yet been for-
mally charged is suggested as being: "Before you say anything (or, if he has already
commenced his statement, 'anything further'), I must tell you that you are not obliged to
do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in
evidence."
The evidence obtained without such a cautionary statement is necessarily consid-
ered admissible evidence. Judges' Rules in GARDENER & LANSDOWN, 1 SOUTH AFRICAN
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE at 613-14 (Sixth ed. 1978). See also 5 H. HAHLO & E.
KAHN, supra note 1, at 613-15.
286. State v. Radebe, 1 S. Afr. L. Rep. 191, 196 (T. 1987).
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this information should be given at the time of arrest or
detainment.
Given the dearth of qualified advocates currently willing to
undertake legal aid cases, greater participation by both lawyers
and law students will be necessary in supplying legal aid.287
Therefore, Parliament should enact legislation creating various
incentives to induce legal practitioners and students to offer
their assistance to indigent defendants. Such incentives could
include tax deductions for firms and practitioners for fees not
recoverable for these services. Another incentive could be to al-
low attorneys in their second year of articled clerkship as well as
advocates during their pupilage to take on these cases.288
In addition, the Bar and Side-Bar can reinforce the govern-
mental incentives by instituting mandatory pro amico undertak-
ings for a specified amount of time per year.289 This could be
considered as an interim situation until current student lawyers
are trained and ready to take on the full-time positions of public
defenders. This personal sacrifice can be justified, not only in
that justice is being served, but also because the legal system as
a whole will be elevated to a more trustworthy position in the
eyes of South Africans.2 90
An under-utilized source of legal assistance can be found in
South Africa's university legal aid clinics. The main problem
with using the university legal aid clinics as a source of legal
representation is that most students are not interested in partic-
ipating and offering these services. If Parliament created incen-
tives such as academic credit, a preference for legal aid clinic
participants when selecting students for public defender posi-
tions, and perhaps scholarships, this large source of manpower
could be tapped. In response to the lack of public awareness of
the Board's existence, Parliament should increase its funding for
legal aid so that there are additional funds available for adver-
tising and educating the public. In addition, Parliament should
enact legislation to teach South Africans about their legal rights
during school.
287. Editorial, Mr. Justice Didcott's Challenge, DE REBUS, Sept., 1988 at 559.
288. In the 1989 Amendment to Act 32 of 1944, this suggestion has been imple-
mented, not solely for the purpose of assisting indigent defendants, but for all cases.
Magistrate's Court Act, No. 32 (S. Afr. 1944) (amended 1989).
289. See supra notes 61, 97, 110 on pro amico and pro deo. See also supra note 52
on Bar and Side-Bar.
290. See Nakani v. Attorney General, 3 S. Afr. L. Rep. 655, 664-65 (Ciskei 1989).
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To insure proper legal, representation, the Board should pri-
oritize its spending for criminal cases, improve its current form
of operation, use its funds more effectively, and solicit additional
funds from other sources. Instituting a public defenders office as
the method of rendering legal aid would resolve many of the
Board's present problems. Not only should the Board switch to
this system of legal aid,29 but also it should limit or prioritize its
resources for criminal matters only. More efficient use of
funds,292 would enable additional lawyers to be hired. The crea-
tion of these jobs would entice more students to study law and
to specialize in criminal defense. Salaries would have to be com-
petitive with the private sector to make the public defender po-
sitions equally attractive. If that is not possible, making the po-
sitions more prestigious would also motivate students to choose
the public defender's office. This could be accomplished by hav-
ing the government and the Minister of Justice give preference
to public defenders in their selection of magistrates, prosecutors,
or other political positions. The Board would be able to service
more applicants because the new system would be more effi-
cient.29 3 With the increase in services rendered to unrepresented
defendants in criminal trials, many cultural prejudices 294 against
the legal system could be lessened. The distrust of the legal sys-
tem based on the perceived lack of impartiality would disappear
through positive personal experiences with the system.
To help the Board solicit additional funds from other
sources, Parliament should declare the Board to be a totally au-
tonomous organization. This could be achieved by having the
Board controlled by the legal community. The new Board should
not adhere to any political policies supported by the government
and the composition of the Board membership should be
changed to reflect this new allegiance to the legal community. 29 5
291. The Legal Aid Act does not specifically call for legal aid to be rendered in the
manner presently chosen by the Board. Therefore, the Act cannot prohibit this subse-
quent change. Legal Aid Act, No. 22, § 3 (S. Afr. 1969); GUIDE, supra note 60, at para.
1.4. See supra note 284 and accompanying text on instituting the public defenders sys-
tem. In April 1991 a pilot project instituting a public defenders system started in the
Johannesburg Magistrate's Court. Interview with A. Trichardt, advocate with the Johan-
nesburg Bar (April 3, 1991).
292. Salaried lawyers are more cost-effective than using the referral method. D. Mc-
QUOID-MASoN, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 122.
293. See supra note 284 and accompanying text on efficiency of public defenders.
294. N. STrYTLER, supra note 1, 14-15. See supra notes 87, 96 and accompanying
text on the perceived lack of impartiality of legal aid officers.
295. The Board should contain fewer governmental ministers and a greater number
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Even though the Board relies on the government for funding,
Parliament should clarify that these funds are not dependent on
the Board following political policies.2 98 Both local and foreign
funding sources are more likely to be granted to such an inde-
pendent organization.297
Ideally, changes made in the legal system must include the
institution of a bill of rights protected by the judiciary which
would give the judiciary the power to strike down "unconstitu-
tional" legislation. While this change may be forthcoming,9 " it
cannot realistically be expected to occur soon. In the meantime,
the changes listed below would improve the situation and should
be instituted.
Changes in the selection of the lower court presiding officers
would greatly improve the image of the impartiality of these po-
sitions. The magistrates for the District and Regional courts are
presently chosen from the ranks of civil servants.299 This is the
same pool from which prosecutors and government bureaucrats
are chosen. This causes a great deal of distrust of the legal sys-
tem's impartiality by the majority of South Africans.300 Instead,
Magistrates should be chosen from the ranks of criminal advo-
cates and public defenders. In this way, defendants will feel that
of representatives from the Bar and the Side-Bar. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text on current Board membership. See also supra note 52 and accompanying text on
Bar and Side-Bar.
296. While there is no direct link between the Government's policies and those of
the Board, in practice it is evident that the Board does take these policies into considera-
tion, given the fact that no political cases have been undertaken by the Legal Aid Board
to date. Interview with E.S. Scholtz, supra note 82.
297. The Board presently receives no outside funding. Supra note 82. Presently, for-
eign contributions are made to the Legal Resources Center, which is run by the legal
community and generally defends test cases. D. McQUoID-MAsoN, OUTLINE, supra note
59, at 126-27.
298. In August 1989, the South African Law Commission prepared a draft a bill of
rights to be incorporated into the South African Constitution. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
COMMISSION, PROJECT 58: GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Working Paper No. 25, 1989)
[hereinafter SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION]. During July 1989, the Lawyers for
Human Rights informally met with the African National Congress (known as the ANC,
at that time an outlawed South African political organization, but presently one of the
two main black political organizations in South Africa) to discuss its response to the
Working Paper. While the ANC would not give an official opinion, it stated, off the rec-
ord, that it approved of 80% of the Bill of Rights portion of the document. Whether this
new constitution will be instituted "as is" will depend entirely on the political climate in
the near future. Presentation by Barry Jammy, partner of Edward, Nathan & Friedland
and member of the Lawyers for Human Rights, who met with the ANC (Aug. 1989).
299. van S d'Oliveira, supra note 35 at 155-56.
300. Hoexter Commission, supra note 9, at part II, paras. 1.4.1-1.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.3.2.
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there is a greater likelihood that the magistrates are impartial
or, at least, do not favor the government. This will also add pres-
tige to the position of a public defender and may induce advo-
cates to choose this position over the better-paying private sec-
tor positions. Finally, the professional caliber of the magistrate
would be increased because the education required for advocates
(and, presumably, public defenders) is higher than that of civil
servants. 30
A practical consequence of instituting legal representation
for indigent criminal defendants will be the drastic decrease in
the number of cases requiring automatic review. This is because
only unrepresented defendants convicted of serious charges302
are entitled to automatic review.0 3 In addition, criminal cases
with represented defendants usually have a much higher acquit-
tal rate, thereby alleviating the state of the costs of incarcera-
tion.04 Both of these factors will save the state time and money,
which can be used to support the increase in legal costs and
court time that it takes to try a defended case.305
VI. CONCLUSION
Confidence in South Africa's legal system will continue to
decline because of the growing number of unrepresented defend-
ants in the criminal courts.0 6 The statutory and administrative
safeguards at present are inadequate.30 7 Justice cannot be done
while the current situation continues to degenerate due to the
unique social, racial and economic conditions prevalent in South
Africa today.30 8
As long as this situation continues, South Africa must insti-
tute more drastic measures to protect the unrepresented defend-
ant. If the courts and the government recognize that all criminal
defendants should be represented, confidence in the legal system
will improve.309 Funds will have to be appropriated, but some
301. See supra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 57 and accompanying text on serious cases.
303. See supra note 68 and accompanying text on automatic review.
304. D. McQuoID-MAsoN, OUTLINE, supra note 59, at 121-22.
305. State v. Davids, 4 S. Mr. L. Rep. 172, 187 (N. 1989); State v. Rudman, 3 S. Afr.
L. Rep. 368, 384 (E.C. 1989). See also supra note 200 and accompanying text.
306. N. STEYTLER, supra note 1, at 14-15.
307. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
309. "No man is so violently anti-social as the man who believes he has not had a
fair trial." Note, 100 S. AFR. L.J. 681, 689, (1983).
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savings will be achieved by the decrease in the number of cases
on automatic review and the higher acquittal rate.3 10 Also, the
additional jobs created by an improved legal system will entice
students to enter the legal profession, thus alleviating the
shortage of lawyers in the long run. In sum, the improvement of
the legal system requires the participation of the Board, the uni-
versities, the police, governmental agencies, as well as the in-
volvement of the private sector.
Albertine Ren~e van Buuren
310. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.

